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R675 minutes at the beginning of cycle 14.
Further evidence implicating Twine
degradation as the key regulator of the
cell cycle transition came from
expressing a GFP-tagged mutant form
of Twine that did not undergo rapid
degradation at cycle 14. Approximately
half of embryos expressing this stable
form of GFP–Twine undergo an extra
mitotic division, while none expressing
a wild-type GFP–Twine control under
the same promoter did so.
Using largely complementary
approaches, Farrell and O’Farrell [6]
also uncovered the central role of
Twine degradation in timing the MBT.
First, they showed that injection of
dsRNA against both string and twine
into cycle 12 embryos had no effect on
the lengths of cycles 12 and 13 and
did not prematurely trigger the MBT.
They further demonstrated that Twine
protein is stable, even upon injection of
the translation inhibitor cycloheximide,
until the MBT when it is rapidly
eliminated. Injection of relatively
large amounts of twine mRNA at cycle
14 led to an extra cell division in
approximately half of the treated
embryos, consistent with the
observations of the Wieschaus
group for expression of the stable
GFP–Twine. Both groups also reached
the same conclusions regarding the
role of the nucleo-cytoplasmic ratio in
Twine degradation, and the lack of
requirement of Chk1 for Twine
degradation.
Farrell and O’Farrell [6] further found
that injection of a-amanitin resulted in
stabilization of Twine. Earlier findings
have shown that zygotic tribbles
activity can destabilize Twine and lead
to premature mitotic arrest at cycle 13
[8,9]. Based on these results, Farrell
and O’Farrell injected tribbles mRNA
into one pole of cycle-12 embryos, and
observed reduced Twine staining, and
in some cases prematuremitotic arrest,
near the site of injection. Analysis
of zygotic tribbles mutant embryos,
and of embryos injected with dsRNA
targeting tribbles, supported a role for
tribbles in fostering Twine degradation,
but not an exclusive one, as the cell
cycle phenotypes that resulted were
only of low penetrance.
The Großhans group used an entirely
different approach [7]. They identified
a mutation in the 3’ untranslated region
of RPII215, a gene that encodes
a subunit of RNA polymerase II. In the
mutant, RPII215 levels are reduced
but its carboxy-terminal domain isprecociously phosphorylated, which
results in a premature onset of zygotic
transcription. This leads to a reduced
number of nuclear divisions and
premature cellularization, thus
independently indicating that zygotic
transcription affects the timing of the
MBT (Figure 1B). Consistent with
other results, injection of a-amanitin
suppressed these phenotypes.
Expression of zygotic genes that are
normally among the first to be activated
in embryogenesis increased most
drastically in the RPII215 mutant.
Analysis of these pointed toward a key
role for the transcription factor Vielfa¨ltig
(Vfl) in timing theMBT, and interestingly
did not support a role for the mitotic
inhibitor fru¨hstart (frs). Vfl binds as
early as cycle 8 to promoters of
approximately 1,000 genes that
become activated at the MBT and
has been proposed by others to be
a critical activator of zygotic gene
expression [10].
Very surprisingly, haploid RPII215
embryos arrest mitotic divisions
prematurely in a similar manner to
diploid ones; an additional mitotic
division was not observed as would
have been expected based on existing
models. This implies that Twine
degradation depends primarily on
the onset of zygotic transcription,
and not on the nucleo-cytoplasmic
ratio. Sung et al. [7] suggest that the
nucleo-cytoplasmic ratio is important
to control some cell cycle regulators,
such as frs, but does not independently
control the onset of overall zygotic
transcription nor of cellularization.
In future studies it will be important
to identify the Vfl-dependent genesrelevant to Twine degradation and to
ascertain whether tribbles is among
them.
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E-mail: paul.lasko@mcgill.cahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.12.012Animal Cognition: An End to Insight?Once hailed as insightful, the string-pulling behaviour of birds may actually rely
on immediate visual feedback rather than mental simulation or planning. But is
this an end to the study of animal insight or a call for a new approach?Amanda M. Seed1
and Neeltje J. Boogert1
What went into the make-up of
Alexander Graham Bell and Steve
Jobs to make them such inventive
problem-solvers? Can flashes of
brilliance or creativity be studied as
psychological phenomena? Have a goat solving puzzles A and B in Figure 1.
They were designed to study
human ‘insight’, and you may have
experienced the characteristic ‘Aha!’
sensation if you grasped the solutions
described in the legend. You might find
puzzle C a bit easier— it has been used
to investigate the phenomenon in birds.
Studying insight in animals could
Figure 1. Insight puzzles.
(A) Maiers’s two-string problem [18]: two strings hanging two arm-span widths apart need to
be tied together. The items in the room may help. (B) Compound word problem [19]: which
single word links these three, either by preceding or following them? (C) Vertical string-pulling
problem: bring the bucket into reach. Solutions: (A) tying the pliers to one rope and swinging it
like a pendulum would allow you to tie the two ends together; (B) ‘apple’ links the words ‘crab,
pine and sauce’; (C) pull the string up hand over hand (see text). Illustrations by Ana Navarrete.
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insight, and help us compare the
mental processes underlying problem
solving in different species. Like
Maier’s two-string task (puzzle A), the
avian string-pulling task could elicit
‘insight’, defined as the sudden
emergence of a complete solution
without trial and error [1]. For birds, the
tricky part is that, after leaning over to
grab the string tied to their perch, they
have to trap each loop underfoot and
hold it while they reach for the next,
until they can grasp the reward.
Remarkably, some individuals from the
large-brained crow [2,3] and parrot
[4,5] families perform this complete
solution from the first time they interact
with the problem. Are they feathered
Archimedes? A new study by Taylor
et al. [6] suggests an alternative
explanation.
Reaching for food and trapping it
underfoot is a natural behaviour formany birds, and so its emergence as
a first ‘trial’ behaviour is not as unlikely
as it might seem [5]. But why would the
birds hold the string and repeat the act
if they didn’t have a solution planned
out from the start? Taylor et al. [6] point
out that each step in the solution brings
the food visibly closer, and this might
be rewarding in itself. They tested their
theory by presenting New Caledonian
crows with a horizontal variant of the
string-pulling task: the string was
coiled-up on a table out of their reach.
Like the classic vertical problem, the
birds had to pull the string several times
to get the reward tied to the end, but
critically the reward did not move any
closer until the string was pulled taut.
The authors predicted that, while
individuals should solve this problem
if they had already ‘mentally modelled’
the complete solution, they would
not be able to do so if they relied on
perceptual-motor feedback. In anearlier study, four naı¨ve crows given the
vertical problem all solved it quickly
and smoothly [7]. Strikingly, in the new
study, 10 of the 11 birds failed to pull
the horizontal string enough to move
the reward at all, although all of
them made an attempt. The one bird
that did pull in the reward had no
significant preference for a connected
string over a broken one (lying in
two segments with a visible break
between them), further evidence
that the naı¨ve birds did not plan out
the solution using knowledge of
‘connection’. The authors conclude
that these findings support their
perceptual-motor-feedback
hypothesis as an explanation for
spontaneous vertical string-pulling in
crows, without the need for insight.
This story of the demise of the
string-pulling task as a test for animal
insight recapitulates that of an earlier
version with primates. Ko¨hler [8]
challenged chimpanzees with a banana
suspended from the ceiling and
a collection of sticks and boxes.
Remarkably, the chimpanzees brought
the boxes beneath the reward and
stacked them two or three high, so they
could climb up and reach their prize.
However, Schiller’s [9] observations of
another group of chimpanzees showed
that, as for the bird’s pull-up-and-step
behaviour, this seemingly clever
sequence of actions may not have
been as insightful as it appeared: his
chimpanzees stacked boxes and even
leapt from them ‘arms outstretched’
in the absence of any reward.
A recent study [10] revealed that, like
the crows, great apes required visual
feedback about the effect of their
actions to solve a new task: they failed
to turn a crank three times to move
a reward within reach when its
progress was hidden from view, but
were successful when they could see
the bait move closer with each crank
turn. Once they had learned, however,
the apes did not need to see the reward
move to continue solving the task just
as smoothly as before. The earlier
results of Taylor and colleagues [7]
suggested that, in contrast, visual
feedback continues to be important for
crows even when executing a learned
solution: the four birds that had solved
the vertical string task subsequently
made errors when they were prevented
from seeing the food coming towards
them by a board with a small hole in it.
In their new paper, Taylor et al. [6]
caution that these errors might be
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R69partially due to the physical difficulty of
gripping and pulling the string through
the small hole, and so this question
deserves further study.
The results of the new study [6] add
to the growing call to ‘deconstruct’
animal insight into its component parts
[11–14]. Rather than simply presenting
naı¨ve animals with tricky tasks to see
howmany can pluck the solution ‘out of
thin air’, researchers have shifted their
focus to manipulating an individual’s
experience and examining how they
can generalise from what they have
seen or done before to new problems.
These studies [10–14] are not about
‘insight’ as such, but about how
animals represent the physical world
and the extent to which they can
mentally plan or simulate. Differences
in these abilities between species
may have important consequences
for how well they cope when
encountering new problems to be
solved, for example, when the
environment changes [15]. Taylor et al.
[6] point out that an ability to capitalise
on visual feedback concerning the
effect of one’s actionsmight be another
important ingredient for successful
problem-solving. The precise cognitive
mechanism by which that is achieved
will be an important question for future
study; operant conditioning is one
possibility, while another is causal
learning [16].
So is this, as Taylor et al. [6] suggest,
an end to insight? Neuroimaging work
supports the idea that human insightful
problem-solving is a qualitatively
distinct (and empirically tractable)
mental process, at least in the case of
verbal-reasoning problems [17]. When
people report having solved problems
like puzzle B in Figure 1 through insight
rather than through exhaustive search
strategies, distinctive patterns of brain
activation (for example, in the right
anterior superior temporal gyrus) point
toward inhibiting the processing of
closely-associated but unhelpful
information in the left hemisphere, and
unconscious activation of distant
connections in the right hemisphere,
when the solution suddenly ‘pops-
up’ [3].
Perhaps comparative psychologists
need to re-visit what a test of ‘insight’ is
trying to capture. In retrospect, the
spontaneous solution of the
string-pulling problem by naı¨ve birds
was always a puzzle: only a minority of
human participants solve insight
problems as it is, and how many couldsolve Maier’s two-string task without
prior experience with string or heavy
objects? An important part of Maier’s
challenge is to overcome the tendency
to view the objects as being fit for
a certain purpose. By capitalising on
this so-called ‘functional fixedness’,
Maier throws us red-herrings, ‘I could
stand on the chair’, we think, ‘or use the
spanner to extendmy reach’. Only once
we have supressed the obvious uses of
the objects do we have a chance of
solving the task. Maybe future studies
of animal insight could similarly adopt
the notion of functional fixedness. If an
object is routinely used in one context,
will it be harder for animals to use it in
a different way to solve a new problem?
Fittingly, if one message from the new
work is that the current paradigms are
better suited to more focussed study of
better-defined cognitive abilities (such
as the role of visual feedback in
problem solving), another is that for the
study of insight, comparative
researchers are going to need to think
outside the box.References
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Past into ViewAttention facilitates perception and can bring stimuli too faint to see into
consciousness. A new study shows that attention can reach into the past,
acting on the memory trace of a stimulus that has disappeared before being
attended.Robert W. Kentridge
Attention acts by facilitating the
processing of selected parts of the
world. Visually we might attend only to
stimuli that are on the left side of space.In experimental studies of attention,
a cue is typically used to tell observers
where to attend, such as a flashing spot
on one side of a display [1]. The effects
of attention vary with the delay
between presentation of the cue and of
